A signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve agent welfare in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between …rms and workers. Workers have almost aligned preferences over …rms: each worker has "typical"commonly known preferences with probability close to one and "atypical"idiosyncratic preferences with the complementary probability close to zero. Firms have some commonly known preferences over workers. We show that the introduction of a signaling mechanism is harmful for this environment. Though signals transmit previously unavailable information, they also facilitate information asymmetry that leads to coordination failures. As a result, the introduction of a signaling mechanism lessens the expected total number of matches.
Introduction
preferences over …rms within blocks that are uniformly distributed (preferences are equally likely). Firms'preferences are uniformly distributed over the range of all possible preference order lists. Each worker can send several signals to …rms. Coles et al. (2009) show that the introduction of signals increases the expected number of matches and the welfare of workers in equilibrium.
Another example of a market where signaling plays a signi…cant role is the market for clinical psychologists, described by Roth and Xing (1997) . They show that the ability of candidates to convey information about the likelihood to accept an o¤er is crucial in the market. Program directors for internships in clinical psychology have a tendency to hire applicants who explicitly express their readiness to accept an o¤er immediately, even if these applicants are of a low quality.
Preference signaling also plays an important role in match formation in the U.S. college admission market. More than a hundred colleges adopted some form of early admission program in the 1990s (Avery et al., 2003) , and many schools …ll a signi…cant fraction of their entering class with early applicants. There are two types of early admission programs: early action programs, where students may apply early but without any commitment to enroll, and early decision programs, where students commit to enroll if accepted. Many schools also require that applicants not send early applications to other schools. Colleges view an early application as a signal of a student's enthusiasm for a particular school. Avery and Levin (2009) show that selective (or elite) schools bene…t from adopting early action policy. At the same time, a lower ranked school, by adopting early decision policy, can attract some highly quali…ed but cautious students, drawing them away from highly ranked schools.
Our main concern in this paper is the job market for new Ph.D. economists. We consider a model similar to that of Coles et al. (2009) and show that signals impede match formation in some environments. Though signals transmit information about agents'preference truthfully, they also introduce information asymmetry. The information asymmetry facilitates coordination failures that decrease the expected number of matches and ambiguously a¤ects the welfare of agents. The negative e¤ect on agents'welfare in new cheap talk equilibria is in line with Farrell and Gibbons (1989) 's results, though it di¤ers in its intuition.
5 Costless communication in their two-agent bargaining model gives the buyer an opportunity to pretend to have a lower value and the seller an opportunity to pretend to have a higher value (compared to the truthful information transmission in our model). This enhances their bargaining positions at the cost of the risk of no trade. New cheap talk equilibria are characterized by both less trade and a reduction in the expected gains from trade. We analyze one-to-one a matching market between workers and …rms in this paper. We examine an environment in which workers have almost aligned preferences. Each worker has either "typical" commonly known preferences with a probability close to one or "atypical" preferences taken from some distribution with the complementary probability close to zero. The preferences of workers are ex-ante independently distributed. 6 Firms have some …xed and commonly known preferences over workers. We consider a decentralized matching game with three stages. First, each worker chooses a …rm, to which she sends her signal. Each worker sends up to one signal; workers send signals simultaneously. Only …rms that receive signals observe them. Second, …rms make decisions about job o¤ers by taking into account signals received at the …rst stage. Each …rm can make only one o¤er. Finally, each worker chooses an o¤er to accept among the available o¤ers. Each worker can accept at most one o¤er. We show that if …rms respond to signals in this environment, i.e. treat signals informatively, the introduction of signals decreases the expected number of matches. The e¤ect of signals on the welfare of agents is ambiguous. Intuitively, signals help workers with atypical preferences to obtain better matches. This also increases the welfare of some …rms. At the same time, signals deprive some agents of their matches. Overall, our analysis suggests that signals play two important roles: 1) they reduce coordination failures because they transmit previously unavailable information about workers'preferences, and 2) they introduce information asymmetry. They transmit information about the preferences of workers to a limited number of …rms, leaving the other …rms uninformed. This information asymmetry facilitates coordination failures.
Finally, we analyze how the welfare implications change if all agents observe the signals each …rm receives, i.e. signals are public. Though the expected number of matches increases compared to the o¤er game with private signals, public signals still impede match formation for some environments. Public signals do not transmit enough information about worker preferences. This induces some …rms to compete for the same workers, which creates mismatches.
A simple example Let us illustrate why signals can facilitate coordination failures by a simple example with three …rms and three workers. The …rms rank the workers in the same way (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ), i.e. they strictly prefer worker w 1 to worker w 2 to worker w 3 . Each worker's preference is either typical (f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 ) with probability 1 " or atypical with the complementary probability "; where " is small. The atypical preferences are uniformly distributed among all possible preference order lists. All workers are acceptable to all …rms and vice versa.
If signals are not allowed, the only possible match in an equilibrium is the assortative match, in which each …rm is matched to the corresponding worker. If signals are allowed, we consider the following equilibrium strategies of agents. 7 Each worker with typical preferences sends her signal to the corresponding …rm (worker w i sends her signal to …rm f i ). Each worker with atypical preferences sends her signal to the best …rm worse or equal to the corresponding one (according to typical preferences). Each …rm makes its o¤er to a worker better or equal to the corresponding one, only if it receives a signal from her. Each …rm ignores all signals from workers worse than the corresponding one. If a …rm receives no signals, it makes an o¤er to the best worker worse than the corresponding one.
Figure I.
Let us consider the realization of preference pro…les when only worker w 1 is atypical and …rm f 3 is her favorite …rm. Worker w 2 and worker w 3 are typical. Figure I illustrates the equilibrium behavior. Worker w 1 sends her signal to …rm f 3 . Worker w 2 and worker w 3 send their signals to …rm f 2 and …rm f 3 correspondingly. Firm f 3 makes an o¤er to worker w 1 , and …rm f 1 anticipates that worker w 1 is atypical and makes an o¤er to worker w 2 . However, the coordination failure arises because …rm f 2 has no information about worker w 1 's type and cannot anticipate …rm f 1 's behavior. Firm f 2 also makes its o¤er to worker w 2 ; however, it eventually ends up unmatched because worker w 2 accepts …rm f 1 's o¤er. Thus, the number of matches for some realization of preferences is smaller than the number of matches when the signals are not allowed. Therefore, the expected number of matches is also smaller.
Related literature
A substantial part of the literature on two-sided matching markets focuses on centralized markets that employ the deferred acceptance algorithm proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) . The outcome of this algorithm is a "stable" matching, in which no agent is matched to an unacceptable agent on the other side of the market, and no pair of agents is unmatched if it prefers to be matched. Centralized clearinghouses organized around the deferred acceptance algorithm can deliver thickness to the market, help to deal with the congestion, and make it safe to participate (Roth, 2008b) . These desirable properties have allowed some previously failed markets to be successfully reorganized. Roth (2008a) and Roth and Sotomayor 7 See Theorem 1 for the proof that these strategies constitute a sequential equilibrium.
(1990) present an excellent overview of the main theoretical accomplishments in this area. As an illustration that preference signaling can be useful in centralized matching markets, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2008) show that the introduction of signaling technology can improve the ex-ante e¢ ciency of the deferred acceptance algorithm in case of weak preferences.
Still, many labor markets are decentralized or at least preceded by decentralized opportunities for participants to match. Therefore, analysis of decentralized matching markets outcomes and the devices that facilitate match formation for them are an important issue. Good examples of papers that study models of decentralized matching markets with nontransferable utility are Pais (2006) and Niederle and Yariv (2009) . The former one models decentralized matching markets by means of a sequential game where …rms are randomly given the opportunity to make job o¤ers. It shows that every stable match can be reached as the outcome of an equilibrium play of the game. The latter ones study decentralized matching markets under incomplete information. They show that strong assumptions are required for the existence of equilibrium strategies that yield a stable outcome in the presence of uncertainty and frictions. Shimer (2005) and Konishi and Sapozhnikov (2008) study models of decentralized matching markets with transferable utility. The former paper studies the assignment of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous jobs in a game with transferable utility. It shows that in an equilibrium when workers use anonymous strategies, i.e. agents' strategies depend on agent's type, not on a particular identity of an agent, a worker's wage is increasing in her job's productivity and a …rm's pro…t is increasing in its employees' productivity. The latter one studies an assignment game of Shapley-Shubik, where each …rm makes a takeit-or-leave-it salary o¤er to one applicant. They show that applicants'(…rms') equilibrium salary vectors are bounded above (below) by the minimal competitive salary vector; this suggests that adopting the minimum competitive salary vector as the equilibrium outcome for decentralized markets does not have a strong justi…cation.
Finally, we want to note that this paper does not analyze search for matches. Agents usually need to perform costly search to locate a better partner in decentralized matching markets. Contrary to search literature (see Chade and Smith, 2006; Lee and Schwarz, 2007; Kircher, 2008) , we assume that agents perfectly know the payo¤s from their matches.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines our general model and introduces some notations. Equilibrium analysis is presented in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes the welfare of agents in the model with and without signals. Section 5 compares these welfare implications with the results in the previous literature and discusses two controversial roles of signals in matching markets. The case of public signals is considered in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 discusses some assumptions of our model and concludes.
Model
We consider a two-sided matching model with W workers and F …rms, W F . The set of workers and the set of …rms are denoted as W and F correspondingly. Both W and F include the empty set. Each worker w orders …rms according to some strict preference list w . Similarly, each …rm f orders workers according to some preference list f . W and F together comprise the set of all possible workers'and …rms'preference lists.
Each agent a has cardinal utility compatible with her/its preference list a 8 . If worker w with preferences w is matched with …rm f , she receives cardinal utility u w (f; w ). Similarly, if …rm f with preferences f is matched with worker w, it receives cardinal utility u f (w; f ). We assume that agent utility depends only on the rank of an agent with which it is matched. Speci…cally, the utility of an agent from being matched with an agent on the kth position in her/its preference list equals u a (k). We assume that agents have the same utility function; i.e. for any agent a, u a (k) = u(k). Our results do not depend on the last assumption; however, this assumption simpli…es the exposition. Additionally, agent's cardinal utility from being unmatched is normalized to zero. We also assume that there is no worker whom …rms do not want to hire, and there is no worker who prefers being unemployed to being matched with some …rm; i.e. for any k; u(k) > 0.
Each agent knows only her/its preferences and has some ex-ante common beliefs about the other agents'preferences. We consider an environment where each …rm f has some …xed publicly known preference list f . Each worker is one of two types: "typical"or "atypical". A "typical"worker w is denoted as w(T ). All workers of typical type have the same commonly known preference list 0 . An "atypical" worker w is denoted as w(A). The preferences of atypical workers are identically and independently distributed according to some distribution A( W ). Each worker is ex-ante typical with probability 1 " and atypical with probability "; for some " 2 (0; 1). Our main analysis considers the case when " is small. 9 We also assume that the distribution of atypical preferences, A( W ); has a full support, i.e. each …rm can be the top …rm of an atypical worker with positive probability 10 .
To model the in ‡uence of signals on congested markets, we consider a model with three periods:
1. Agents'preferences are realized. Each worker sends a signal to at most one …rm; signals are sent simultaneously. Signals are observed only by …rms who have received them.
2.
Each …rm makes an o¤er to at most one worker; o¤ers are made simultaneously 11 .
8 We employ cardinal utilities compatible with ordinal ranking similar to Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) . 9 The exact bound on " depends on the parameters of distribution A( W ). However, for each distribution A( W ), one could …nd an upper bound of ". We provide a more detailed discussion in Section 7.
10 Formally, for any f 2 F and any w 2 W Pr(f = max w (f 0 : f 0 2 F)) > 0. 11 In practice, some …rms should rationally make several o¤ers, anticipating that some workers probably 3. Each worker may accept at most one o¤er from the set of o¤ers she receives.
We restrict our analysis to pure strategies. 12 
The dependence of …rm strategy on preferences is omitted, because we assume that each …rm has some …xed preferences. For a given strategy pro…le of agents s = (s w ; s f ) and realized agents'types 2 ( W )
F one can determine the …nal matching and agents'utilities. We denote the utility of agent a given a strategy pro…le s and a pro…le of types as a (s; ): The interim expected payo¤ of worker w with preferences w from strategy s w when the other agents follow a strategy pro…le s w equals
where t( w ) denotes the joint distribution of all agents except worker w preferences. The interim expected payo¤ of …rm f given a subset of received signals h W, beliefs f ( jh); and other agents'strategy pro…le s f is
We employ the concept of sequential equilibrium for multi-stage games with observed actions and incomplete information in order to solve the game (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) .
reject their o¤ers. We do not model these strategic decisions.
12 The analysis of the o¤er game in which agents can use mixed strategies does not give additional intuition to our main result that signals could impede match formation for some environments. However, this analysis is available upon request.
De…nition 1 A strategy pro…le (s w ; s f ) and posterior beliefs f ( jh) for each …rm f and each subset of workers h W is a sequential equilibrium if for any w 2 W; w 2 W : s 1 w ( w ) 2 arg max 2F u w ( js w ; w ); for any f 2 F; h W : s f (h) 2 arg max 2W u f ( js f ; h); and for any w 2 W; w 2 W ; h
where beliefs are de…ned using Bayes'rule.
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Now we introduce some notations that will be useful in our further discussion. Though worker strategy is a duple s w = (s 1 w ; s 2 w ), we will talk mainly about worker strategies at the …rst stage. The reason is that each worker has a strictly dominant strategy at the last stage accept the best o¤er available since she knows her preferences and the preferences are strict. To simplify notation, we omit the upper index and write s w ( w ) instead of s 1 w ( w ). For convenience, we name …rms according to the typical preference list 0 = (f 1 ; :::; f F ); i.e. f 1 is the best …rm, f 2 is the second best, etc. Similarly, we name workers in the following way: worker w 1 is the best worker among all workers W according to …rm f 1 's preferences, w 1 = max f 1 (wjw 2 W); worker w 2 is the best worker among Wn fw 1 g according to …rm f 2 's preferences, w 2 = max f 2 (wjw 2 Wnfw 1 g); and so on. Generally, worker w i = max f i (wjw 2 Wnfw 1 ; :::; w i 1 g) if i F . The other workers Wnfw 1 ; :::; w F g are named according to some prespeci…ed order. 14 We say a subset of workers h W is reached for …rm f when workers follow strategy pro…le s W if ex-ante probability that only workers from set h send their signals to …rm f strictly more than zero.
De…nition 2 A subset of workers h W is reached for …rm f when workers follow strategy pro…le s W if
where
and t( ) denotes the joint distribution of all agents' preferences.
We also say that …rm f responds to worker w's signal, when workers follow strategy pro…le s W ; if her signal changes the strategy of …rm f with positive probability.
De…nition 3 Firm f responds to worker w's signal, when workers follow strategy pro…le s W , if there exists a subset of workers h; w = 2 h, such that both h and h [ w are reached for …rm f , and
We proceed with equilibrium analysis in the next section.
Equilibrium analysis
As a benchmark, we …rst consider an environment in which workers cannot send signals. Then, the model outlined above is a static game of incomplete information. Therefore, the notion of sequential equilibrium coincides with the notion of Bayesian equilibrium and agents'beliefs are irrelevant. There is a unique equilibrium match in this case.
If signals are not allowed and " is small, the only optimal strategy of …rm f 1 is to make an o¤er to its best worker w 1 = max f 1 (wjw 2 W). The second top …rm anticipates that worker w 1 is likely to accept …rm f 1 's o¤er. Hence, the only optimal strategy of …rm f 2 is to make an o¤er to its best worker among Wn fw 1 g ; w 2 = max f 2 (wjw 2 Wnfw 1 g) and so on. Workers accept the best available o¤er. Overall, there is the maximum number of matches, F (since F W ), in the equilibrium when signals are not allowed.
Proposition 1 (No signaling equilibrium) For su¢ ciently small ", there is a unique equilibrium when signals are not allowed: …rm f j ; j = 1; :::; F; makes an o¤er to worker w j ; worker w i ; i = 1; :::; F; accepts the best available o¤er.
We further call the match in our benchmark model as "no signaling"match. Now, we analyze the set of equilibria in the matching market with signals. Though signals are voluntary in our model, they could still play a negative role and draw away …rm o¤ers. In order to eliminate such equilibria, we assume that if …rm f makes an o¤er to worker w when it does not receive her signal, …rm f makes an o¤er to worker w when it receives her signal.
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Assumption PRS (Positive Role of Signals). For any …rm f 2 F and any worker w 2 W and any
We further distinguish three types of equilibria in the matching model with signals.
15 See Example A1 in Appendix for an example of an equilibrium in which Assumption PRS is violated.
De…nition 4
An equilibrium is "babbling" if no …rm responds to any signal.
An equilibrium is "informative", if at least one …rm responds to some worker's signal.
An equilibrium is "very informative", if each …rm responds to all signals from workers better or equal to its no signaling match.
The set of the …rst and second type equilibria, i.e. babbling and informative, exhaust the set of all possible equilibria in our model. The set of equilibria of the last type is a subset of the set of informative equilibria.
A babbling equilibrium always exists in our model because signals are costless. If …rms do not respond to signals, signals play no role in equilibria. Hence, the only possible match in a babbling equilibrium is no signaling match.
Proposition 2 For su¢ ciently small "; the only possible match in a babbling equilibrium is no signaling match.
If some …rms respond to signals, then signals transmit information about workers'preferences in an equilibrium, which changes the overall matching outcome. However, there is a great multiplicity of informative equilibria. One may suggest to use re…nements proposed by (Cho and Kreps, 1987) and (Banks and Sobel, 1987) . 16 However, these criteria are very powerful in the case of one sender and one receiver. The situation with many senders and receivers is more di¢ cult. Though these criteria signi…cantly reduce the number of equilibria, they do not guarantee uniqueness. However, it is su¢ cient to restrict ourselves to the case in which each …rm responds to all signals from workers better or equal to its no signaling match, i.e. very informative equilibria, in order to guarantee uniqueness. This equilibrium consists of the following strategies. Worker w i sends her signal to the best …rm among the …rms that prefer worker w i to their no signaling match (w i ) = (f j 2 F : w i f j w j ): If …rm f j receives at least one signal from the set of workers (f j ) = (w 2 W : w f j w j ); i.e. workers better or equal to worker w j , it makes its o¤er to the best such worker; otherwise, it makes an o¤er to its best worker among Wnfw 1 ; :::; w j g: Theorem 1 For a su¢ ciently small "; under Assumption PRS the set of strategies,
max f j (w : w 2 Wnfw 1 ; :::;
and the set of …rms' beliefs consistent with agents' strategies constitute a unique very informative equilibrium.
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The above theorem is remarkable because it shows that the equilibrium of the model is unique, if we restrict our attention to the case in which …rms use signals most extensively. However, we should point out that we do not intend to eliminate all other equilibria. First, the theorem illustrates typical agents'behavior in an informative equilibrium. Workers do not just send signals to the best …rms. They send their signals to the best …rms that respond to these signals, which is in line with AEA advice to participants in the job market for new Ph.D. economists (see AEA, 2005) . Similarly, …rms do not respond to all signals. Instead they respond to the signals from workers better than those they could secure in the no signaling equilibrium. Second, our results of welfare comparison do hold for most other sequential equilibria.
Welfare properties of equilibria
We evaluate the e¤ect of signals on the matching market from an ex-ante perspective. We mainly use the following quantitative characteristics: the expected number of matches, the expected total welfare of …rms, and the expected total welfare of workers.
Let us denote the ex-post number of matches for the pro…le of preferences 2 W F , when agents follow the pro…le of strategies s as m(s; ). Then, the expected number of matches can be expressed as
where t( ) denotes the joint distribution of all agents'preferences. Similarly, the expected total welfare of workers and …rms can be expressed as
correspondingly. Proposition 1 shows that the expected number of matches in any no signaling equilibrium is the maximum one. Hence, it is impossible that the expected number of matches in any informative equilibrium exceeds the expected number of matches in any "no signaling" equilibrium. Example 1 and Example 2 demonstrate the case of strict inequality and equality for this welfare criterion.
Example 1 is presented in the introduction and considers the very informative equilibrium with three …rms and three workers. To avoid a repetition, we do not discuss it here.
Example 1 (Fewer expected number of matches) There are three …rms and three workers .Firms have the same ranking over workers (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ). The typical worker preference list is 0 = (f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 ). Atypical worker preferences are uniformly distributed. Firm f j ; j = 1; 2; 3; and worker w i , i = 1; 2; 3; equilibrium strategies are
and the set of …rms'beliefs consistent with agents'strategies.
Example 2 shows that some informative equilibria could have the maximum expected number of matches. Intuitively, it is possible that if some …rm f j secures a better match with some atypical worker w i , …rm f i always makes its o¤er to …rm f j 's no signaling match, worker w j , in an equilibrium. Therefore, …rms exchange their matches and it does not decrease the number of matches.
Example 2 (Equal expected number of matches) Let us consider three …rms and three workers. All …rms have the same preferences f j = fw 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 g: Let us consider the following equilibrium strategies:
max f j (w : w 2 Wnfw 1 ; :::; w j g) otherwise ; for j = 1; 2;
The set of equilibrium beliefs is such that if …rm f 1 or f 2 receives a signal from worker w 1 , it believes that it is worker w 1 's top …rm. If …rm f 3 receives a signal from worker w 1 ; its belief coincides with her prior, i.e. worker w 1 is typical with probability 1 " and atypical with probability ". Similarly, if any …rm f j receives a signal from worker w 2 or w 3 , its belief coincides with its prior. To put it brie ‡y, only …rm f 1 and …rm f 2 respond to worker w 1 's signal. All other signals are ignored. One may check that the described strategies constitute an informative equilibrium.
The results about the expected total welfare of …rms and the expected total welfare of workers are not so straightforward and depend on the relative magnitudes of u(k). The intuition is that signals in an informative equilibrium play two roles. On the one hand, signals help to secure "better" matches between some atypical workers and …rms. On the other hand, the introduction of signals leaves some workers and …rms unmatched. Example 3 illustrates that the introduction of signals is bene…cial for a matching market according to egalitarian welfare criterion if and only if the decrease in the number of matches is o¤set by better matches of atypical workers. A similar example can show that the total welfare of …rms changes ambiguously.
Example 3 (Welfare of …rms and workers) Let us again consider the game of Example 1. Workers'cardinal utilities from being matched to …rst, second, and third choice are + ; ; and correspondingly. The expected total welfare of workers in no signaling match
One may check that the expected total welfare of workers in very informative equilibrium is .
The theorem below summarizes the results derived above.
Theorem 2 For a su¢ ciently small " :
the expected number of matches in any informative equilibrium is weakly fewer than in any no signaling equilibrium;
the e¤ect of signals on the expected total welfare of …rms and the expected total welfare of workers is ambiguous.
18 Terms of the order of " 2 and " 3 are ignored.
We have compared above the properties of any informative and no signaling equilibrium. However, more strict result holds for very informative equilibrium. Under the assumption that there are at least three workers and there exists a worker w, such that there are at least three …rms that weakly prefer worker w to their no signaling matches, jff j 2 F : w f j w j gj 3; the expected total number of matches is strictly fewer in very informative equilibrium than in the corresponding no signaling match. The intuition for this result is similar to the one for Example 1. If …rms respond to signals, some of the realized matches di¤er from no signaling match. Moreover, if at least three …rms respond to some worker's signal the exchange of matches the situation presented in Example 2 is impossible for each realization of preferences. Therefore, the expected number of matches is smaller than the maximum one in this case.
Theorem 3 For su¢ ciently small "; if there are at least three workers and for some worker w, j (w)j 3, the expected number of matches is strictly smaller in the very informative equilibrium than in the corresponding no signaling equilibrium.
Theorem 2 proves that the expected total welfare of workers changes ambiguously with the introduction of signals. However, the following proposition shows that signals are harmful to workers only because they deprive them of matches. Workers receive weakly better o¤ers conditional on the fact that they receive any o¤er.
Proposition 3 If a worker receives an o¤er in any informative equilibrium, this o¤er is from a …rm weakly better than her no signaling match.
It is easy to see that the above statement is not true for …rms, because some …rms may have to make o¤ers to workers worse than their no signaling match if she is atypical. Coles et al. (2009) show that the introduction of signals increases the expected number of matches and the welfare of workers. However, they consider an environment where agents' preferences are block-uniform. Speci…cally, there exists a partition F 1 ; : : : ; F B of the …rms into blocks and Table I Table I . Almost complete VS Block-uniform distribution preferences.
Role of signals in matching markets
A natural question is why signals in ‡uence matching markets in di¤erent ways. We argue that the signals play two di¤erent roles: transmit information and facilitate information asymmetry. On the one hand, the introduction of signals helps atypical workers to transmit information about their preferences and locate a better match. On the other hand, signals transmit information only to some …rms, thus facilitating information asymmetry. This information asymmetry leads to coordination failures that decrease the number of matches.
When there is ex-ante small amount of information about agents'preferences, information transmission plays a more important role in match formation. This happens when agents' preferences are ex-ante block-uniform, as in Coles et al. (2009) . However, when there is almost complete information about agents'preferences as in the model of this paper the introduction of signals leads to coordination failures. Overall, the signals play controversial roles in the match formation process. This could make them a less powerful tool than it was previously anticipated.
Public signals
One could conjecture that should signals be public, they would always bene…t match formation. Public signals introduce no asymmetry of information among …rms. Firms have the same beliefs about the distribution of workers'preferences and the same beliefs about the strategies other …rms use. Therefore, …rms should be able to make o¤ers that are more likely to be accepted. Unfortunately, this intuition is incorrect. This section illustrates that the expected number of matches in an equilibrium of the o¤er game with public signals could be smaller than the expected number of matches in the o¤er game without signals.
We consider a market with three …rms and three workers. The distribution of agents' preferences is the same as in Section 2. Each worker can send at most one signal and accept at most one o¤er. Each …rm has only one vacant position and can make at most one o¤er. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. Agents'preferences are realized. Each worker sends a signal to at most one …rm; signals are sent simultaneously. All agents observe what signals each …rm receives.
2. Each …rm makes an o¤er to at most one worker; o¤ers are made simultaneously.
3. Each worker chooses an o¤er to accept from the set of o¤ers she receives.
The only di¤erence from the game we considered previously is that all agents observe the signals each …rm receives. The strategies of workers are the same as in Section 2. However, a strategy of …rm f now depends on the set of signals each …rm receives, s f : F W ! W.
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As previously, the only equilibrium outcome of the o¤er game with signals is a full match. However, the expected number of matches could be smaller than three if we allow workers to send public signals. Intuitively, public signals do not transmit enough information about workers'preferences. This could introduce a considerable amount of uncertainty about workers'preferences. Therefore, some …rms can optimally engage in a competitive behavior for some workers; i.e. …rms make their o¤ers to the same worker in an equilibrium. This produces mismatches.
Example 4 There are three …rms and three workers. Firms have the same ranking over workers, which we denote as (w 1 ; w 2 ; w 3 ). The typical worker preference list is (f 1 ; f 2 ; f 3 ). The atypical worker preferences are uniformly distributed. We assume that all …rms have the same cardinal utility and their utility from being matched to second top worker, i.e. u(2); is at least twice as great as the cardinal utility from being matched to the third top worker, i.e. u(3).
We consider the following strategies of agents in the o¤er game with public signals. Worker w i sends her signal to the best …rm among the …rms that weakly prefer worker w i to their no signaling match (w i ) = (f j 2 F : w i f j w j ):
Firms use the following strategies.
1. Firm f 1 makes an o¤er to worker w 1 , if it receives a signal from her; otherwise, it makes an o¤er to worker w 2 .
2. Firm f 2 makes an o¤er to worker w 1 ; if it receives a signal from her. Firm f 2 makes an o¤er to worker w 3 , if either worker w 1 sends a signal to …rm f 1 and worker w 2 sends a signal to …rm f 3 or worker w 1 sends a signal to …rm f 3 and worker w 2 sends a signal to …rm f 2 . In all other cases, …rm f 2 makes an o¤er to worker w 2 .
3. Firm f 3 makes an o¤er to the best worker from whom it receives a signal. If it receives no signals, it makes an o¤er to worker w 3 :
Each …rm's beliefs on the equilibrium path are consistent with agents'strategies and each …rm o¤-equilibrium beliefs coincide with priors.
Let us consider the strategies outlined in Example 4. Mismatches happen when both worker w 1 and worker w 2 are atypical. If at least two atypical workers send their signals to the same …rm, only one worker receives an o¤er from it. Since, signals are public, all other …rms infer that the other worker is atypical. This creates a considerable amount of uncertainty about the worker preferences. Since, this worker could be a good one, …rms have incentives to compete for her.
Another reason for excessive competition among …rms is that signals may not transmit information about workers'top …rms. Some workers send their signals to …rms that di¤er from their top ones in an equilibrium, because they want to attract feasible o¤ers. Therefore, several …rms could have incentives to make an o¤er to a given worker. This creates competition among …rms, which again lead to mismatches. Proposition 4 formally proves that the set of strategies in Example 4 constitutes a sequential equilibrium.
Proposition 4 The set of strategies in Example 4 constitutes a sequential equilibrium.
The implications of the above example can be summarized by way of two observations. First, public signals do not transmit enough information about workers'preferences. This could introduce uncertainty about workers preferences and induce excessive …rm competition for the same workers. This results in mismatches.
In addition, mismatches in the o¤er game with public signals occur only if there at least two atypical workers, which happens only with probability of the order " 2 . In contrast, mismatches in the o¤er game with private signals occur with the probability of the order ". Therefore, mismatches happen less often when signals are public.
Conclusion
There is a general belief that preference signaling should facilitate match formation (see Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Roth, 2008b; AEA, 2005) . This belief is also supported by Coles et al. (2009) who show that the introduction of signals increases the expected number of matches and welfare of workers. We show in this paper that this belief can be erroneous for some matching markets. We exemplify an environment in which the introduction of signals harms matching markets: it decreases the expected number of matches and ambiguously a¤ects the welfare of …rms and the welfare of workers. Based on this example, we argue that signals play controversial roles in match formation. Though they help to transmit information about participants' preferences, they also facilitate information asymmetry among them. While the former e¤ect reduces coordination failures and facilitates better match formation, the latter e¤ect acts in the opposite direction. Finally, we show that making signals observable to all agents does not change the welfare applications. We leave here as an open empirical question which e¤ect dominates in real matching markets.
In conclusion, we want to discuss some assumptions of our model. We analyze the introduction of signals to congested decentralized matching markets, as we believe the job market for new Ph.D. economists to be. The fact that we do not analyze any centralized clearinghouse mechanism and stable matches captures the idea of decentralized markets. The fact that we analyze a one-period model captures the idea of congestion. Moreover, several (but …nite) periods of interactions between …rms and workers would give an opportunity for …rms to secure better matches; but signals would still introduce information asymmetry. If each worker sent several signals, these would transmit information to a greater number of …rms, but each signal would be less informative. Several vacant positions would make only the preferences of …rms more complicated and would not in ‡uence the results. Overall, the roles of signals in match formation are robust to these modi…cations.
The results of this paper are in terms of a su¢ ciently small ". However, what we really need is the uniqueness of equilibrium in the benchmark model without signals. The multiplicity of equilibria does not allow a clean comparison between models with and without signals. One could check that there is a unique equilibrium in no signaling model with uniform distribution of atypical preferences if " < min(min i (
We should also highlight that we rely on cardinal utility in our analysis. Our results could not be extended to an ordinal framework, because an Ordinal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (see d 'Aspremont and Peleg, 1988) may not exist in our environment.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Let us show this statement for each …rm sequentially. Each worker w i has preferences 0 = (f 1 ; :::; f F ) with probability 1 " and with complementary probability some preferences distributed according to A( W ). Let us consider …rm f 1 which has some preferences f 1 . If it makes an o¤er to worker w 1 = max f 1 (wjw 2 W), its o¤er will be the best worker w 1 's o¤er with probability at least 1 ". Hence, its expected utility from making an o¤er to worker w 1 equals at least (1 ")u(1) which is greater than u(2) for su¢ ciently small ". Hence, independently on other …rms'strategies, …rm f 1 's optimal strategy is to make an o¤er to its best worker.
Let us assume that each …rm f k , k < j; makes its o¤er to worker w k . Now we consider the decision of …rm f j . The expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to some worker among fw 1 ; :::w j 1 g is less than "u(1). In the same time the expected payo¤ from making o¤er to some worker among Wnfw 1 ; :::w j 1 g is at least (1 ")u(j): Hence, given the strategies of other …rms and su¢ ciently small ", the optimal strategy of …rm f j is to make an o¤er to its best worker among Wnfw 1 ; :::w j 1 g.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The only undominated strategy of a worker at the last stage is to choose the best o¤er among available ones. Then, under the condition that …rm f does not respond to any signal, for any h W reached in an equilibrium s f (h) = const. Let us assume that there exists a realization of agents'preferences such that …rm f 1 is matched to some worker w i , i > 1; in the equilibrium. Hence, for any h W; reached in the equilibrium, s f 1 (h) = w i . Hence, the expected …rm 1's payo¤ equals at most u(2). However, the strategy s f 1 (h) = w 1 for any h W is compatible with assumption that …rm f 1 does not respond to any signals and gives payo¤ (1 ") u(1) independently of strategies of other …rms. Hence, s f 1 (h) = w i cannot be an equilibrium strategy. Similar argument could be applied to any other …rm f j , j = 2; :::; F:
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the theorem by way of several lemmata. In the proof of the lemmata we presume that " is su¢ ciently small. First, we establish that a …rm believes about a particular worker is typical with probability more than 1 " either when it receives her signal or when it does not receive her signal. Second, we show that …rms do not make their o¤ers to a worker better than no signaling match if they do not receive her signal. The third lemma proves that if a …rm does receive a signal from a worker better than its no signaling match, it makes its o¤er to the best such worker. Finally, using the statements of lemmata we show that the set of strategies stated in the theorem constitutes a unique very informative equilibrium.
First two lemmata do not require the assumption that each …rm f j , j = 1; :::; F; responds to all signals from workers better or equal to worker w j according to its preferences.
Lemma A1 For any worker w 2 W, any …rm f 2 F, and any
Proof.
Let us denote as T and A the probabilities that typical and atypical type of worker w correspondingly send a signal to …rm f . Then, if worker w sends her signal to …rm f; (1 ") T + " A > 0; we derive its beliefs using Bayes'rule
One can verify that (
If worker w never sends her signal to …rm f , (1 ") T + " A = 0; …rm f 's beliefs are f ( w = 0 jhnw) = 1 " and
is arbitrary. The second statement directly follows from the …rst one.
Lemma A2 (O¤er to better workers) If …rm f j does not receive a signal from worker w strictly better than worker w j , w f j w j it does not make an o¤er to her in an equilibrium.
Proof.
We prove this statement for …rms sequentially. Let us …rst show its validity for j = 2. The only worker that could be better than worker w 2 for …rm f 2 is worker w 1 by construction. If w 2 f 2 w 1 we are done. Assume that w 1 f 2 w 2 :
There are two possibilities: either worker w 1 (T ) sends her signal to …rm f 1 , i.e. s w 1 ( 0 ) = f 1 ; or she does not send her signal to …rm f 1 , i.e. s w 1 ( 0 ) 6 = f 1 , in an equilibrium.
Assume worker w 1 employs strategy s w 1 ( 0 ) = f 1 . If …rm f 2 does not receive worker w 1 signal, …rm f 2 believes she is atypical with probability less than "; f 2 ( w 1 6 = 0 jhnw 1 ) " (Lemma A1). According to assumption F W; …rm f 2 can secure a match with some worker w i ; i 2; with probability at least 1 ". Hence, …rm f 2 does not make an o¤er to worker w 1 in an equilibrium.
Worker w 1 employs strategy s w 1 ( 0 ) 6 = f 1 in an equilibrium only if …rm f 1 makes its o¤er to worker w 1 with probability equals to one, and …rm f 2 has a chance to be matched with worker w 1 only if she is atypical. Assume …rm f 2 makes an o¤er to worker w 1 when it does not receive her signal. If w 1 (T ) sends her signal to …rm f 2 in an equilibrium, according to Assumption P RS …rm f 2 should also make an o¤er if it receives a signal from w 1 . However, if it receives a signal from w 1 , the probability that worker w 1 is atypical less than " (Lemma A1), which contradicts equilibrium behavior. Now, we assume that worker w 1 (T ) does not send her signal to …rm f 2 in an equilibrium. If …rm f 2 does not receive worker w 1 's signal, …rm f 2 believes that she is atypical with probability less or equal ", f 2 ( w 1 6 = 0 jhnw 1 ) " (Lemma A1). Therefore, it is again suboptimal for …rm f 2 to make an o¤er to worker w 1 if it does not receive a signal from her.
We have shown above that it is suboptimal for …rm f 2 to make an o¤er to worker w 1 if it does not receive a signal from her. Let us assume that it is suboptimal for any …rm f j ; j < k to make its o¤er to a worker w t , t < j; if …rm f j does not receive a signal from it and show that the claim for …rm f k :
We consider some worker w i , i < k. Firm f i makes its o¤er to workers fw 1 ; :::; w i 1 g with probability less than " (i 1) : In addition, worker w i is atypical with probability ". Hence, …rm f k can secure a match with worker w i with probability equals at most i" if it does not receive a signal from her: For small enough " …rm f k 's o¤er to worker w i is suboptimal. Now, we assume that each …rm f j , j = 1; :::; F; responds to all signals from workers better or equal to worker w j according to its preferences. The following lemma shows that …rm f j makes its o¤er to some worker w better or equal to worker w j if worker w's signal is the best signal …rm f j receives.
Lemma A3 (Response to signals) Assume that F > W: Then, for any h W s f j (h) = max f j (w : w 2 h) if h \ (f j ) 6 = ? in very informative equilibrium 20 :
We prove this statement for …rms sequentially. Let us consider …rm f 1 and worker w 1 . Assume that worker w 1 employs strategy s w 1 ( 0 ) 6 = f 1 . Then, …rm f 1 believes that for any h W f 1 ( w 1 = 0 jhnw 1 ) 1 ". Therefore, for su¢ ciently small ", …rm f 1 always makes its o¤er to worker w 1 , which contradicts to our assumption that it responds to worker w 1 's signal. Therefore, under the assumption that …rm f 1 responds to a signal from worker w 1 , the only possible worker w 1 's equilibrium strategy is s w 1 ( 0 ) = f 1 . In this case, for any h W …rm f 1 's belief is f 1 ( w 1 = 0 jh [ w 1 ) 1 ". Hence, …rm f 1 's highest expected payo¤ when it receives worker w 1 's signal is from making an o¤er to worker w 1 . Hence, for any h W; …rm f 1 's strategy s f 1 (h [ w 1 ) = w 1 is optimal.
Assume now that for any t j < k, and for any h W, …rm f j employs strategy for
We prove below that …rm f k 's optimal strategy for any h W and
There are two possibilities: either
Hence, it is optimal for …rm f k to make an o¤er to worker w k when it receives no signals from workers better or equal to worker w k ; i.e. for any h
Hence, it is also optimal for …rm f k to make an o¤er to worker w k when worker w k 's signal is the best signal it receives, i.e. for any h
00
W such that such that h 00 \ (f k ) = w k ; s f k (h 00 ) = w k : Therefore, …rm f k does not respond to worker w k 's signal. Contradiction. For the latter case, s w k ( 0 ) = f k , if …rm f k does not receive a signal from worker w k , it anticipates that she is atypical. Therefore, …rm f k does not make its o¤er to her. If …rm f j receives signals from any worker w i w k no other …rm f p ; p 6 = j and p > i; makes its o¤er to worker w i according to Lemma A2: The only o¤ers that compete with …rm f j 's o¤er could be the ones from the set ff p ; p < ig: However, any …rm f p , p < i; could make an o¤er to worker w i only if worker w p is atypical, which happens with probability ". Hence, the interim expected payo¤ for …rm f j from making its o¤er to worker w i equals at least (1 (i 1)")u 0 ; where u 0 = u f j (w i ; f j ). Firm f j expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to any other worker from set (f j ) is smaller than (1 (i 1)")u 0 as this worker either has not sent a signal to …rm f j or has a smaller rank in …rm f j 'preferences. The expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to some worker Wn (f j ) is smaller either. Therefore, …rm f j optimal strategy is;
Now we are ready to prove the theorem. Let us show that the set of strategies, stated in the theorem, constitutes an equilibrium. We …rst prove that if all agents, except …rm f l ; follow the strategies, stated in the theorem, …rm f l 's strategy is optimal given its belief is consistent with the other agents'strategies. If …rm f l receives a signal from worker w t ; t < l; …rm f l believes that itself is the best …rm among (w t ) = ff j 2 F : w t f j w j g. Let us assume that worker w t is the best worker who sends a signal to …rm f l . Worker w t does not accept …rm f l 's o¤er only if she receives an o¤er from some …rm f k 2 Wn (w t ). However, it happens only if worker w k is atypical, i.e. with probability less than ". Hence, …rm f l interim expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to worker w t equals at least (1 (n 1) ") u 0 ; where
Firm f l 's o¤er to a worker better than worker w t is not optimal according to Lemma A1. Firm f l 's expected payo¤ from making an o¤er to some worker w, w t f l w; is also smaller than making an o¤er to worker w t for su¢ ciently small ": Overall, …rm f l 's strategy is optimal. Let us show that, if all agents, except worker w t ; follow the strategies, stated in the theorem, worker w t 's strategy is optimal. Firm f t does not make an o¤er to worker w t when it receives a signal from a better worker. Therefore, if worker w t is typical, her payo¤ from sending a signal to …rm f t equals at least [1 (l 1)"] u(t). If worker w t does not send her signal to …rm f t it loses her o¤er and she could get payo¤ at most u(t 1), which is less than [1 (l 1)"] u(t) for su¢ ciently small ". There is also no reason for worker w t to send her signal to a …rm better than …rm f t ; because this …rm does not respond to her signal according to its equilibrium strategies. Hence, worker w t (T )'s strategy is optimal. Using similar logic one can show that worker w t (A)'s strategy is also optimal. Now we show that the above strategies constitute the unique very informative equilibrium. Lemmata A2 and A3 imply that each …rm f l , l = 1; :::; F; has to follow the following strategies in an equilibrium:
Straightforwardly, the only worker w l (T )'s optimal strategy is to send her signals to …rm f l , s w l ( 0 ) = f l , otherwise, …rm f l 's does not make an o¤er to student w l :
Let us consider …rm f = max w l (f 0 2 (w l )). Firm f responds to signals from workers better or equal than no signaling match and its equilibrium beliefs are f ( w l = 0 jhnw l ) 1 " and f ( w l 6 = 0 jh [ w l ) = 1. Therefore, if …rm f does not receive a signal better than worker w l 's one, it's optimal strategy is to make an o¤er to worker w l . Taking into account that …rm f can receive a signal from a better worker with probability less than (l 1)", worker w l (A)'s optimal strategy is to send her signal to …rm f (for su¢ ciently small "): Hence, the strategies, stated in the theorem, constitute the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Assumption that A( W ) has a full support and that the strategies of the very informative equilibrium guarantee that some worker w i sends her signals to each …rm in the set (w i ) = jff j 2 F : w i f j w j gj with positive probability. Then, using logic of Example 1 and Example 2 it is straightforward to show that when there are at least three …rms in the set (w i ) and there are at least three workers the mismatch happens with positive probability. Therefore, the expected number of matches strictly smaller than in the corresponding no signaling equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. The statement directly follows from the strategies of the very informative equilibrium.
Example A1 (An equilibrium when assumption PRS does not hold) Let us consider two …rms and two workers. We assume that all …rms have the same preferences over workers f 1 = f 2 = fw 1 ; w 2 g: Also we assume that each typical worker has preferences 0 = (f 1 ; f 2 ) and each atypical worker has preferences A = (f 2 ; f 1 ) with probability equal to one. Firms prefer worker w 1 to worker w 2 . Agents employ the following strategies: It is easy to show that the above strategies and the set of beliefs constitute a sequential equilibrium. One may extend this example for the environment with more …rms and workers.
Proof of Proposition 4.
Let us …rst prove that …rms'strategies are optimal. Note that if …rm f receives a signal from worker w 1 it believes that it is her top …rm. Therefore, it is optimal for her to make her an o¤er. Now, if …rm f 1 that does not receive a signal from worker w 1 , …rm f 1 believes that worker w 1 is atypical and will not accept its o¤er. Then, …rm f 1 strategy of making an o¤er to worker w 2 is optimal for any signaling pattern, because it believes that her o¤er will be accepted at least with probability 1 2 . The worst case is when worker w 2 is atypical and sends her signal to …rm f 3 . Now we consider …rm f 2 optimal strategy. Let us consider the case when worker w 1 sends her signal to …rm f 1 and worker w 2 sends signal to …rm f 3 . Firm f 2 believes worker w 2 prefers …rm f 3 to itself. Since, …rm f 3 makes an o¤er to worker w 2 , and …rm f 1 makes an o¤er to worker w 1 ; the only worker that could accepts …rm f 2 o¤er is worker w 3 . If worker w 1 sends he signal to …rm f 3 and worker w 2 sends her signal to …rm f 2 . In this case …rm f 1 makes an o¤er to worker w 2 , who is typical with probability (1 1 3 "). Since, worker w 1 most preferred …rm is …rm f 3 ; the optimal strategy of …rm f 2 to make an o¤er to worker w 3 .
Let us consider the case …rm f 3 receives signals from all workers. In this case …rm f 3 makes an o¤er to worker w 1 . It is optimal for …rm f 1 and …rm f 2 to make an o¤er to worker w 2 because her preferences over these …rms could be equally likely. Hence, the payo¤ from making an o¤er to worker w 2 equal 1 2 u(2) > u(3). Similar, one could show that in other cases it is optimal for …rm f 2 to make an o¤er to worker w 2 :In a similar way one could show that it is always optimal for …rm f 3 to make an o¤er to the best worker it receives a signal from.
Let us now show each worker uses optimal strategy. Worker w 1 strategy is optimal, because any …rm makes her an o¤er upon receiving her signal. There is no incentive for worker w 2 to make an o¤er to …rm f 1 since, all …rms upon observing such behavior has believes about workers preferences that coincides with the priors. Therefore, worker w 2 optimal strategy is to send her signal to the best …rms among f 1 and f 2 .
Since …rms do not put attention to worker w 3 signals, there is no reason for her to deviate from the equilibrium strategy.
